In this research, it uses an AODV routing protocol for the analysis. It explains the route discovery phase in the AODV protocol and highlight the vulnerabilities in it that can be exploited by an attacker. It then investigates the impact of a malicious route flood attack on the network. It use an AODV routing protocol for our analysis, explains the route discovery phase in the AODV protocol and highlight the vulnerabilities in it that can be exploited by an attacker. It then investigates the impact of a malicious route flood attack on the network.
INTRODUCTION
WMNs are becoming increasingly popular as they provide cheap and ubiquitous broadband Internet access [1] . WMNs consist of a group of static MRs that are connected by wireless links. It obviates the need for extensive wired backhaul network by connecting only a small subset of MRs (known as IGWs) to the wired backbone. Other MRs forward their traffic in a multihop fashion towards the IGW. On the other hand, open wireless communication channel and the multihop nature of communication can pave way to malicious intruders. A malicious intruder can exploit the hidden loopholes in the routing protocol, to conduct various kinds of attack such as route disruption attacks and packet forwarding attacks. Bhargava et al. demonstrated that a false distance vector and a false sequence number attack can drastically reduce the network throughput by 75% [2] . Building a secure routing protocol (SEAD, Ariadne) is not a complete solution to thwart attacks on the routing protocol, as MRs are often deployed in public locations (like rooftops, streetlights, poles etc.) that are easily accessible to potential adversaries.
In order to detect malicious route floods in a WMN, it proposes to deploy an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) on every MR in the network. As WMNs don't suffer from power constraints, MR can be made as a monitoring agent. It proposes IDS based on a machine learning technique called perceptron training. The IDS collects a set of statistics on few route and data parameters such as RREQ (Route Request), RREP (Route reply), and RERR (Route error), data packets originated, and data packets forwarded [3] .
MALICIOUS ROUTE FLOOD ATTACK AND ITS IMPACT
AODV is a reactive ad hoc routing protocol. A source node in AODV initiates a route discovery to a destination only if its route entry is unknown or old [4] . It broadcasts a route request packet (RREQ) requesting for a route to the required destination. This attack is known as a malicious route flood attack. Fig. 1 (left) shows the effect of a malicious route flood (1 RREQ/sec) on the instantaneous throughput of flows at the IGW (all flows not shown for clarity), under a randomly chosen traffic profile. We see that while the throughput of flow-3 is affected by a small percentage (45%) only, the throughput of flow-1 and flow-2 are drastically reduced by 99% in the presence of a malicious route flood attack. Fig. 1 (right) illustrates the average number of packets transmitted at each MR in the presence and the absence of a malicious route flood attack. 
PERCEPTRON BASED IDS
In this section, we present the application of a machine learning technique called perceptron in IDS. We first present the high level architecture and then discuss the configuration of our perceptron based classifier.
An IDS is deployed at every MR in the WMN. The architecture of the proposed IDS is shown in Fig.2 . Anomaly Detector: It consists of the trained perceptron model. The monitored statistics is fed as input to the perceptron classifier, which gives a binary output (t). A positive output is indicative of a normal condition and a negative output is indicative of an attack. An alert is issued by the alert module on detecting attack to block the intrusion and a report is lodged in the intrusive log.
Known Attack Profile: The training data for the perceptron model is generated by conducting experimental simulations using ns-2. The known attack is grafted into the simulation and the accumulated network statistics gathered during this period are labeled as attack instances.
We model the detection of malicious flood attack as a typical classification problem. Perceptron is used as a classifier to assess the network status based on the monitored network activity. Perceptron is the simplest form of a linear classifier. For a given set of n inputs x1, x2, …, xn, the output is:
Where each wi denotes the contribution of each input xi to the perceptron output. Here, w0 denotes the threshold that the linear combination of inputs must surpass for an output 1.
The perceptron training algorithm involves the evolution of the weight vector w, which would correctly classify all the instances presented to it in the training stage. We input a feature vector of route and data parameters to the perceptron along with the label ω1 or ω2), which represents the class of the instance (where ω1 represents a normal instance and ω2 represents an attack instance).
We begin the training with some random assignment of weights. When the perceptron misclassifies an example, the weights are actively adapted according to the following perceptron training rule: wi = wi +ηxi if wixi <= 0 and xi ∈ω1 Where η is the learning rate of the algorithm which moderates the extent to which weights are changed. We set η to a small value of 0.02. Thus, N training examples consisting of normal and attack instances are presented to the algorithm iteratively. The algorithm is repeated until all the examples are correctly classified. It is important to note that a perceptron can be applied for linearly separable data points only. To highlight the fact that the attack instances and the normal instances are linearly separable in the space of detection metrics, we tested the data by performing k-means clustering test. We see from the silhouette plot (MATLAB) in Fig.3 , that our training sample is perfectly classified into two clusters (attack and non-attack instances).
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We next study the performance of our proposed perceptron based IDS using simulations performed in ns-2 [5] . We use the same scenario and attack configuration as described in Section 3. Each simulation is run for 600 sec. We generate a sample size of 33,500 feature points, comprising of 50 % of attack instances and 50 % of normal instances. The training period is set for 500 epochs so that the weights of the perceptron model converge for sure. We use about 50 % of the generated data for our training model and the other half is used later for testing and validation purposes. We evaluate the network performance based on the following metrics: True positives (TP): Number of times an alert is raised, when an attack is present. False negatives (FN): Number of times when no alert is raised, but attack is present. False positives (FP): Number of times when alert is raised, but attack is not present. True negatives (TN): Number of times when no alert is raised, when no attack is present. The performance of our classification algorithm is thus based on TPR (True positive rate) and FPR (False positive rate). TPR=TP/(TP+FN),which is the ratio of number of alerts when there is an attack to the total number of attacks. Similarly, FPR =（FP/TN+FP）.
We illustrate the detection accuracy (TPR) of the trained perceptron model for various sizes of training sample in Fig.5 (left) . We find that the accuracy of the model is smaller for just few sample size. The model achieves best results for a training size of 4000-8000 instances. We next study the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve (TPR vs. FPR) which reflects the tradeoffs in the sensitivity of the detection algorithm. Fig.4 （right） shows the ROC curve for our detection scheme. We observe that in our scheme very less number of normal instances are misclassified as anomalies (as seen by 0 FPR value) and all attack instances are correctly identified as intrusions (as seen by the high TPR value close to 1). Table 1 summarizes the misclassification rate of our algorithm for different generation rate of RREQs by a single malicious MR. Misclassification rate is defined as the percentage of inputs misclassified during one training epoch (include FP and FN). Fig.5 (left) demonstrates the detection ability of our system when the number of malicious MRs generating malicious requests is increased. Even if only a small percentage of the MRs are malicious, we see that our perceptron based IDS accurately detects them with a high TPR of 98% and has close to 100% detection rate for largely compromised network. This is because for a high attack rate, the data is easily separable in the space of detection metrics and is thus easily classifiable by the perceptron model. Similarly, Fig.5 (mid) shows the FPR for varying number of good MRs. A large number of good MRs imply very few MRs are compromised. It can be seen that the maximum value of FPR is within 23%, for a largely compromised WMN. We also see that as the attack rate increases, the FPR increases indicating that a small percentage of false alarms would be raised from time-to-time.
Both graphs prove that the proposed perceptron based IDS has a very high TPR (100%) and a low FPR (23%). The proposed IDS, thus detects malicious route discoveries accurately and efficiently. It also illustrates the fact that the features (detection metrics) selected as inputs for training the perceptron model, are accurate predictors of the attack.
We next study the effect of learning rate (η) on the detection rate of our proposed IDS. It is important to choose a small value for the perceptron to correctly classify the data with a low FPR and a high TPR. We see from Fig.5(right) , that a lower learning rate has a higher detection rate over higher learning rate. Hence, we choose an ideal learning rate of 0.02 for our model.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, it proposed an intelligent machine learning technique based on linear perceptron classifier to detect malicious route discoveries. It models the detection of malicious route flood as a classification problem. As malicious route flood attack has a global effect at every MR in the WMN, the IDS raises a timely alert on the occurrence of the attack. We prove through extensive simulations, that our perceptron based IDS model has a high detection rate and a low false positive rate. As a part of our future work, it plan to use other machine learning techniques like multi-layer perceptron model to detect attacks like selfish node and blackhole attack, which fail to get classified by a linear perceptron model.
